Os efeitos da falta de cooperação e coordenação entre os órgãos legitimados a firmar acordo de leniência

Abstract

The present essay aims to analyze the issue regarding the legal uncertainty caused to collaborating companies due to the lack of cooperation and coordination between the bodies that have legal grounds and/or are legally assigned to enter into a leniency agreement. For this purpose, the essay will briefly describe the types of leniency existing in Brazil and the main  difficulties and weaknesses of the anti-corruption leniency, which precede and justify, in part, the crystal clear institutional disorganization when it comes to leniency agreements. 

Finally, in order to illustrate the problem, the essay will analyze the case of the leniency agreement signed by Andrade Gutierrez SA and Odebrecht, which clearly portray the need for alignment between the multiple bodies that are part of the Brazilian anti-corruption microsystem.

The relevance of the theme is to highlight the ongoing issues arising from the institutional disorganization, which may discourage the collaborating companies by creating a scenario of insecurity and non-compliance to the signed agreements, which, ultimately, can be extremely harmful to the Public Power, both in terms of reimbursement of the Public Treasury,
and in terms of the dismantling of complex corruption schemes.